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Since the mid-1990s, the political economy of civil wars has acquired unprecedented 
relevance for scholars and policymakers as important to preventing and mitigating 
armed conflict. The issue is now under scrutiny by nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), research institutes, humanitarian and aid organizations, governments, 
international financial organizations (IFIs), and, importantly, the United Nations (UN).  
This paper provides a tour d’horizon of this field, based largely on the research findings 
and policy debates that have emerged from the International Peace Academy’s 
three-year project on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW), which concluded in 
2004. 
We first present an overview of the policy and research factors that led to the launch of 
the EACW programme. We then discuss our findings and their policy implications, 
which were informed by a growing body of research elsewhere. The next section 
analyses some policy options. Issues for further research and policy action are offered in 
the concluding section.   
2  Economic dimensions of intrastate conflict: an evolving research  
and policy agenda 
The emergence of the political economy of civil war as a research agenda resulted from 
a convergence of political factors, policy concerns, and academic interests in the early 
to mid-1990s.1 Against the significant shifts in the post-cold war global and economic 
order, some analysts had come to speak of qualitatively distinct, ‘new wars’ 
characterized by economic predation and increasing civilian casualties (Kaldor 1999; 
Duffield 2001; Berdal 2003). ‘Perhaps more than any single factor, [the] new focus on 
the economics of intrastate conflicts was prompted by an observable increase in the self-
financing nature of combatant activities’ (Ballentine and Sherman 2003a: 1). Faced with 
a decline in superpower support, both government and rebel combatants sought 
alternative sources of revenue to sustain their military campaigns, often through trade in 
legally or illegally exploited natural resources, smuggling of contraband and drugs, and 
the capture of diaspora remittances. The resulting ‘war economies’ thrive on links with 
arms brokers, transnational criminal networks, corrupt governments, and certain 
corporations, reaching well beyond war zones to the world’s commodity markets and 
major financial centres (Duffield 1999; Jean and Rufin 1996). 
Given the important role of natural resources as a source of combatant financing, the 
term ‘resource wars’ soon gained currency (Cilliers 2000; Renner 2002; Klare 2001). 
Examples abound. During Cambodia’s civil war, both the government and the Khmer 
Rouge experienced few difficulties selling rubies and high-grade tropical timber on 
world markets (Le Billon 2000a). Liberia’s warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor 
was able to export large quantities of rubber, timber, and diamonds to finance his 
violent rebellion and subsequent incursion into Sierra Leone (Ellis 1999); in Colombia, 
guerrillas and paramilitaries have increasingly engaged in the production and trafficking 
of drugs (Richani 2002). Perhaps nowhere was the humanitarian price of these 
                                                 
1  Parts of this section draw on Malone and Sherman (2005). 2 
developments more evident than in Angola, where revenue from oil and diamond 
exploitation generated huge profits for the rival elites but contributed to enormous loss 
of life and crippling poverty for most Angolans (Cilliers and Dietrich 2000).  
Within the policy community, the Canadian Foreign Ministry developed an early 
interest in the role of economic factors in civil wars. A Global Issues Bureau was 
created in 1995, which sought to connect policy areas believed relevant to contemporary 
conflict, including human rights, humanitarian issues, crime and terrorism, and post-
conflict peacebuilding. Then-Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was deeply 
engaged in developing a ‘human security’ agenda, focused on the protection of 
individuals rather than primarily that of state interests. With its election to the UN 
Security Council for a term in 1999-2000, the Canadian government focused on the 
reform of UN sanctions, which had proliferated during the 1990s. These sanctions 
regimes often achieved the opposite of their intended effect—humanitarian crises 
deepened, while dictatorial regimes became more entrenched (and enriched on the 
proceeds of black market dealings) in part through sanctions evasion.2  
In January 1999, Canada took over the chairmanship of the Council’s somnolent Angola 
Sanctions Committee, responsible for the monitoring of ‘targeted’ sanctions against the 
rebels of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by 
Jonas Savimbi (Angell 2004). In May 1999, Canada’s Ambassador to the UN, Robert 
Fowler, commissioned an in-depth independent study by a panel of experts on the 
taxonomy of sanctions-busting in Angola. Borrowing well-honed tactics of advocacy 
organizations, the resulting report ‘named and shamed’ not only Belgian, Ukrainian, and 
Israeli businessmen and arms traffickers but also sitting heads of state—the presidents 
of Togo and Burkina Faso—for their involvement in the trafficking of diamonds and 
weapons in violation of the sanctions (UN 2000).3 For the UN, these shock tactics were 
novel and, to many, unwelcome. But expert panels established for subsequent of 
sanctions regimes and related economic strategies were to make ample use of such 
instruments, drawing on NGO, academic and forensic financial and economic research 
(Vines 2004). 
During the same period,  a body of studies illuminating the economic ‘drivers’ of 
contemporary civil wars was emerging from the United Kingdom (UK) (Berdal and 
Keen 1997; Keen 1998). Until then, most scholarly writing on civil conflict after the 
cold war tended to concentrate on the costs of conflict and to treat civil war as a 
disruption of ‘normal’ social, economic, and political patterns within society.4 ‘Peace’ 
and ‘war’ had been understood as distinct categories, the latter being viewed as 
inherently dysfunctional.5 This dichotomy has a long tradition in western thinking and 
influenced the way international organizations approached civil wars. Scholars such 
David Keen by contrast demonstrated  that far from being irrational, violence often 
                                                 
2   See the seminal study by Cortright and Lopez (2000), as well as Cortright and Lopez (2002). The 
Swiss, German, and Swedish government-sponsored Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm 
processes have generated useful recommendations for improved sanctions design and enforcement. 
3   Particularly in these early days, UN expert panels drew heavily on admirable investigative work by 
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada. See Global Witness (1998) and Smilie, Gberie and 
Hazleton (2000). 
4   For example, Brown and Rosecrane (1999). 
5   Cf. Keen (2001).  
 
3 
serves both political and economic functions for combatants, civilians, and external 
actors.6 Keen saw many of these conflicts as ‘the continuation of economics by other 
means’ (Keen 1998: 11, and Keen 2001).7 Where there is more to war than winning, 
those benefiting from violence may often have a vested economic interest in the 
conflict’s perpetuation, posing major challenges to international peacemaking and 
peacebuilding efforts (Berdal 1996; Collier 1994). 
Against this background, in 1999 the International Peace Academy, the Centre for 
International Studies at Oxford University, the governments of Canada, the UK, and 
others, organized a conference in London on ‘economic agendas in civil wars’. Bringing 
together leading academics and practitioners, including Paul Collier, David Keen, Mark 
Duffield, and Will Reno, the meeting aimed to improve the understanding of the 
political economy of armed conflict by examining the economic motivations and 
commercial agendas of contending factions; to assess how globalization creates new 
opportunities for these elites; and to examine the policy responses available to external 
actors, including governments, international organizations, NGOs and the private sector, 
to shift the economic agendas of elites in civil wars towards peace.8  
With hindsight, these objectives were too ambitious for a single conference. The 
following year, work in this area was passed from the UK and Canadian governments to 
the International Peace Academy in New York, which established a three-year research 
and policy development project on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW) to probe 
further into the research and policy questions that had emerged at the London 
conference.9  
The EACW project evolved in parallel with and was informed by other research 
projects, including the World Bank’s work on ‘The Economic of Civil War, Crime and 
Violence’, UNU-WIDER’s research on the ‘Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies’ in 
partnership with Queen Elizabeth House at Oxford University,10 as well as its research 
project on ‘Why Some Countries Avoid Conflict While Others Fail’, and the Fafo 
Institute’s ‘Economies of Conflict’ project on the role of private sector actors in war 
economies. Numerous research and advocacy organizations have since added a ‘war 
economy-dimension’ to their agendas.11  
                                                 
6  Keen’s early research on violence and political dysfunction in Sierra Leone was critical in spurring 
Ottawa to spearhead further work on the economics of civil wars. These topics are fully explored in 
his soon to be published volume (2005) The Best of Enemies: Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. 
7   For similar functionalist perspectives, see also Chabal and Daloz (1999), Reno (1995), and Reno 
(1998). 
8   Views and findings aired at the conference were subsequently published in Berdal and Malone (2000). 
9  The British and Canadian governments were joined in funding for the EACW programme by 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Rockefeller Foundation, the UN Foundation, and the International 
Development Research Center (IDRC). The total budget was US$2.7 million. For more information 
on the EACW programme, see www.ipacademy.org (completed programmes). 
10 Two volumes emerged from this research project, see Nafziger, Stewart and Väyrynen (2000). 
11  These include, inter alia, International Alert, the Bonn International Center on Conversion (BICC), 
the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and 
Oxfam America, as well as the Center for Public Integrity. 4 
3  Research and policy development: findings and policy implications 
The EACW programme’s research agenda addressed four assumptions that reflected 
thinking in this field in 1999: that economic factors are consequential to combatants’ 
decision to pursue war or seek peace; that economic ‘greed’ of rebels is the major cause 
of conflict, not socioeconomic or political ‘grievances’; that resource-rich countries are 
more prone to armed conflict than others; and that local war economies and conflict 
dynamics are affected by their linkages with global commodity and financial markets.  
The programme was organized into two interrelated research phases. The first focused 
primarily on country case research involving both secessionist and anti-secessionist 
insurgencies to gain understanding of the motives of combatant groups and of conflict 
dynamics.12 The second research phase focused on policy development.13  
3.1  Beyond greed and grievance: country case research14  
Of the early writing on the economic dimensions of violence and armed intrastate 
conflict, none was more influential—if controversial—than the ‘greed thesis’ by Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler.15 Much of the academic debate became polarized around the 
greed versus grievance dichotomy in explaining civil war put forward in their articles. 
Among the many important findings of their econometric work, the most widely 
reported was that natural resource dependence (measured in terms of primary 
commodity exports as part of GDP) is correlated with a higher risk of conflict (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2000/2003). This was interpreted to suggest 
that resources provide the motivation or opportunity for rebels to finance their military 
campaigns through resource predation. That rebels can ‘do well out of war’ was 
advanced as better explaining the onset of conflict than sociopolitical grievances, such 
as income inequalities, ethnicity, or lack of political participation (Collier 2000a).  
The greed thesis had a tremendous impact on policy discourse, easily bridging the often-
deplored chasm between quantitative research and policymaking (see Mack 2002). 
Collier’s findings were particularly appealing to policymakers discouraged by the 
complexity and seeming intractability of ‘ethnic’ and religious conflicts of the early 
1990s. If many contemporary conflicts are driven by contests over economic resources, 
these ‘resource wars’ might be more amenable to resolution than conflicts over such 
identity issues as ethnicity, religion, or ideology (Ballentine 2003: 274).  
Among academics, however, Collier’s findings met with more scepticism. Several other 
quantitative studies pointed to methodological questions over the natural resource 
dependency-conflict correlation (see Sambanis 2002; de Soysa 2002; Ross 2004a). The 
                                                 
12  The country cases were Colombia, Kosovo, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma, Papua New Guinea, Angola, 
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The studies were published as 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003b). 
13 Assessments of numerous policy and legal mechanisms to address the role of natural resources in civil 
wars will be published as Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005b). 
14 This section draws on Ballentine and Sherman (2003b) and Ballentine and Nitzschke (2003). 
15  According to Fearon (2004: 2), ‘the study’s main finding and the author’s interpretation of it may be 
the most widely reported result of any cross-national statistical study of civil war, ever’.  
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dataset used in Collier’s work, for instance, does not include diamonds and narcotic 
crops (see Fearon 2004: 4), which were often cited in the ‘war economies’ literature 
(and in World Bank press releases) as the loot of greedy rebels. Michael Ross concluded 
that ‘the claim that primary commodity exports are linked to civil war appears fragile 
and should be treated with caution’ (Ross 2004a).  
Among country experts and comparative scholars, particularly from the developing 
world, there was uneasiness over Collier’s dismissal of political, social and other 
grievances as ‘rebel discourse’ not to be trusted.16 Country case studies, including those 
commissioned by the EACW project, found economic motivation or opportunity of 
rebel groups not to be the main factor for the onset of the conflicts analysed. Rather, the 
onset of violent conflict was triggered by the interaction of economic motives with 
long-standing grievances over the mismanagement or inequitable distribution of 
resource wealth, exclusionary and repressive political systems, inter-group disputes, and 
security dilemmas exacerbated by unaccountable and ineffective states (Ballentine 
2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Nafziger and Auvinen 2003).  
The studies also highlighted the explanatory limits and a worrying degree of state-bias 
of ‘rebel-centric’ studies on the economic dimensions of conflicts. We found that the 
correlation between natural resource dependency and conflict risk is not a direct 
relationship; neither is the opportunity for rebellion merely a function of the presence of 
such resources in a given country (Ballentine 2003: 261-7). Both qualitative and 
quantitative studies confirm that critical governance failure by the state appears to be 
the mediating variable between resource abundance and the risk of armed conflict. 
Systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, patrimonial rule, and the political 
and socioeconomic exclusion of ethnic or other minority groups (‘horizontal 
inequalities’), are permissive factors conducive to the onset of both separatist and non-
separatist conflicts.17. 
EACW research confirmed two key relationships between resource wealth and armed 
conflict, posited by studies on the so-called ‘resource curse’  (Karl 1997; Gelb et al. 
1988; Ross 1999; Ross 2001; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ascher 1999; Gary and Karl 
2003). First, mismanagement of resource wealth may create grievances that—
particularly when fused with a history of ethno-secessionist tendencies—may become 
permissive factors for armed conflict. The inequitable sharing of revenues from natural 
resources (or the perception thereof) is a major factor in separatist conflicts such as in 
Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, and Sudan (Alao and Olonisakin 2001; Herbst 2001; ICG 
2002; Regan 2003). Second, the resource curse can corrode state institutions, with 
important implications for armed conflict. ‘Unearned’ resource rents that allow elites to 
buy security through corrupt patrimonial networks, rather than through the 
establishment of a ‘social contract’ based on the tax-financed provision of public goods 
and services, may in the long run undermine the regime’s legitimacy and relative 
military, political, and economic strength, rendering it vulnerable to rebellion (Le Billon 
2003; Addison and Murshed 2002; Moore 2000; Reno 2000: 43-8; Reno 2002). The 
weaker the state, such as in Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Zaire/DRC, the more feasible 
                                                 
16  See Porto (2002); Alao and Olonisakin (2001); Herbst (2000); Cramer (2002); Hutchful and Aning 
(2004); Addison and Murshed (2003). 
17  See Fearon and Laitin (2003); Sachs and Warner (2001); Stewart (2002); Cater (2003); Nafziger and 
Auvinen (2003). 6 
becomes rebellion—whether to reform the kleptocratic patrimonial system or simply to 
grab a slice of the pie.  
While our findings do not support a direct causal relationship between economic 
motives and opportunities and the onset of armed conflict, they do confirm that 
economic factors, including access to natural resources and other sources of finance, can 
have important consequences for the character and duration of conflicts, as well as on 
efforts to end war (Ballentine 2003). Studies that analysed the types of natural 
resources, their modes of exploitation, the way their benefits accrued to conflict 
stakeholders, and the distinct impacts of these issues on conflict dynamics and types of 
conflict were particularly useful (Le Billon 2001a; Ross 2003; Ross 2004b; Snyder nd). 
Furthermore, conflicts that start as political rebellions can mutate over time as economic 
considerations become equally or even more important to some combatants than 
political aspirations. The Angolan conflict, the quintessential ‘resource war’, for 
instance, had its roots in an anti-colonial struggle and resource predation became 
relevant only in the latter stages of the conflict. Similarly, gemstones or drugs became a 
prominent source of rebel self-financing in the grievance-driven conflicts in Burma, 
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, and the DRC only after fighting there had 
broken out (Ross 2004b).  
Many contemporary conflicts have become systemically criminalized, particularly 
where access to lucrative assets exists. Today’s combatants (both rebels and 
governments) have increasingly engaged in illegal economic activities either directly or 
through links with international criminal networks engaged in the trafficking of arms 
and drugs, smuggling, and money laundering (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003: 16-7). 
The degree to which combatants move in and out of criminality varies. In Colombia 
both the guerrilla groups and paramilitaries engage in narco-trafficking and money 
laundering, as well as kidnapping and extortion. In African conflicts, such as the DRC, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola, rebel groups have tended to work with shadowy 
‘conflict entrepreneurs’ attracted by the high profit margins and the lack of regulation 
and law enforcement in these conflict zones. 
Case study research furthermore highlights the importance of business actors as 
intermediaries between local war economies and global commodity and financial 
markets (Le Billon 2001b; Raeymaekers and Cuvalier 2002; Swanson 2002, Global 
Witness 2002). Companies, especially in the extractive industries, can willingly or 
unintentionally contribute to conflict dynamics. The anarchic environment of conflict 
zones also opens up business opportunities for ‘rogue companies’, those usually small 
firms that use conflict as a cover for operations and that in some cases actively supply 
combatants (Taylor 2002). The regulation of business actors may thus be an important 
tool for conflict prevention and resolution (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2004). 
‘War economies’ in fact serve different functions for different conflict stakeholders. In 
addition to combatant elites, war economies can provide benefits for civilian 
populations where the informal economy is widespread and where traditional 
livelihoods are destroyed during conflict (Mwanasali 2000; Pugh 2002; Goodhand 
2004). Artisanal diamond mining activities in Sierra Leone, coca and poppy cultivation 
in Colombia and Afghanistan, as well as diaspora remittances in Sri Lanka, Kosovo, and 
Nepal have become critical sources of survival for the civilian population. While often 
under predatory control of rebel forces, civilian incomes from these activities sustain 
livelihoods and compensate for the state’s failure to provide basic services.  
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Lastly, the economic activities of belligerents may become powerful barriers to war 
termination for several reasons. Income from the exploitation of lucrative resources and 
combatant remuneration in the form of licence to loot and pillage may be important 
factors in the fragmentation of both militaries and rebel groups (Ballentine 2003: 270). 
In the DRC, the number of rebel groups—financed in part through the exploitation of 
coltan and alluvial gold in the Kivu provinces—increased steadily throughout the 
conflict and its ongoing violent afterlife (Grignon 2005). Resource predation can also 
create command and control problems among combatant groups. An example is the 
oft-cited ‘sobel’ phenomenon (‘soldiers by day, rebels by night’) witnessed in Angola 
and Sierra Leone where soldiers frequently colluded with rebels for personal gain in the 
diamond-rich areas, with negative consequences for military discipline and the civilian 
population (Reno 1998: 126-7; Adebajo 2002; Keen 1998: 20; Sherman 2003). In such 
circumstances, it can be harder for leaders to impose peace agreements on their 
rank-and-file followers. 
Revenues generated through resource predation and shadow economies can also 
exacerbate what Stephen Stedman (1997) has termed the ‘spoiler’ problem (see also 
Zahar 2003). Spoilers have a range of motives for opposing peace agreements—from 
unmet political aspirations, to personal grudges, to ideological or religious convictions. 
However, spoilers operate most effectively where sources of self-financing (or outside 
support) are readily available. A comparative study of sixteen peace settlements 
between 1980 and 1997 confirmed that two of the main factors in failed peace 
implementation were the proliferation of combatant parties and the continued 
availability of valuable natural resources (Downs and Stedman 2003).18  
3.2  Some policy implications from the research 
These findings have important implications. At a minimum, they caution against 
extensive reliance on econometric modelling or ‘resource reductionist’ approaches to 
explaining contemporary armed conflict (Cater 2003). While many economic activities, 
and particularly the exploitation of natural resources, contribute to hostilities, they do so 
in a diffuse and indirect way. In addition, policymakers need be wary of a state-bias. 
Resource predation can benefit governments as well as rebel groups. Bringing state 
motives and behaviour back into the equation highlights the importance of transparent, 
equitable, and accountable resource management for conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Nitzschke and Studdard 2005). 
The increasing criminality of today’s conflicts presents policymakers with a dilemma. 
For some observers, contemporary insurgent groups are comparable, at least in theory, 
to criminal organizations (Collier 2000b). But should policymakers treat them as such? 
However much insurgency and criminality may overlap, they are not the same. Whereas 
criminal organizations employ violence in the sole pursuit of profit, combatant groups 
engage in illicit trade and economic predation at least in part to pursue military and 
political goals (Williams and Picarelli 2005). Casting rebellions simply as a criminal 
endeavour rather than a political phenomenon obscures legitimate grievances and 
forecloses opportunities for negotiated resolution of the conflict if strategies of 
                                                 
18 Similarly, Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis find in their quantitative study that primary 
commodity exports are negatively associated with the success of peacebuilding efforts in 124 wars 
that occurred between 1945 and 1997.  See Doyle and Sambanis (2000). 8 
prosecution or military defeat are preferred over mediation (Ballentine 2003: 270-1; 
Gutiérrez Sanin 2003). The dangers of this approach are compounded in the current 
climate of the ‘war against terrorism’, in which yesterday’s ‘rebels’ have become 
today’s ‘criminal terrorists’. 
Policy needs to be sensitive to the different functions that war economies may serve to 
their participants. Some engage in the war economy to finance the war effort, others for 
personal enrichment. Yet others are forced to participate to secure their survival. It is 
important to address the functions of the shadow economy that benefit the enemies of 
peace and stability, but also those aspects socially beneficial to civilian dependants 
(Pugh 2002; Woodward 2002).  
For policy development, the key question deriving from all the previous ones is how to 
make peace more profitable than war. This is what our second track of work focused on. 
4  Policy development: managing the resource dimension of armed conflict 
The EACW programme focused on policy development conducted along two vectors: 
an assessment of the regulatory and legal mechanisms on offer to the international 
community to address the economic dimensions of conflict; and the impact of the 
regional dimensions of conflicts, as well as the legacies of war economies on conflict 
resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding.19 
4.1  Assessing and promoting global regulatory practices and legal dimensions 
to address the economic dimension of armed conflict 
As we have seen, the self-financing nature of many contemporary civil wars has drawn 
attention to the connection between the trade in natural resources, global financial 
flows, and armed conflict. Consequently, curtailing and managing these resource flows 
through ‘control regimes’ has become a matter of increasing interest (Cooper 2002; 
Bannon and Collier 2004). The EACW programme’s work in this field was premised on 
a number of observations from expert meetings and workshops: the need for a strategy 
to coordinate existing and emerging policy mechanisms that can address globally and 
regionally networked war economies; the inadequacy of current private sector voluntary 
approaches to promote responsible corporate behaviour in conflict-prone and war-torn 
countries; and the potential of international law to address the problem of combatant 
and corporate exploitation and trade in conflict goods (Sherman 2002a). 
We endeavoured to assess relevant and promising policy, regulatory, legal, and market-
based mechanisms (see Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005b). The rationale underlying 
resource and finance control regimes, including UN sanctions and commodity 
certification regimes, is fairly straightforward: if conflicts thrive on the trade in ‘conflict 
goods’, then curtailing these resource flows may help prevent or resolve conflict. The 
same, then, should hold true for efforts aimed at attacking organized and ‘white collar’ 
crime, and the financial lifelines of combatants—all closely linked to local war 
                                                 
19  This section of the paper draws in part on Ballentine (2004a) and Nitzschke (2003).  
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economies in the form of arms and drugs trafficking, diaspora remittances, money 
laundering, corruption, and, possibly, terrorist finance. 
In addition, the programme focused on policy instruments to minimize the negative role 
of private sector actors in zones of conflict. Important insights were gained from a 
private sector working group that included company representatives and other experts in 
this field. Off-the-record discussions allowed for frank discussions and identified some 
legitimate concerns of company representatives (see Sherman 2001 and 2002b).  
Policy development in this field need not be undertaken from scratch. A range of policy, 
regulatory, and legal instruments exist on the national, regional, and global levels that 
can address war economies (and their fallout) in order to enhance conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution (see Le Billon, Sherman and Hartwell 2002; Bannon and Collier 
2004).  
Perhaps the single most robust instrument specifically deployed to curtail the flows of 
finances, natural resources, and arms to and from combatants is targeted sanctions (i.e., 
arms and commodity embargoes, travel bans, and financial freezes) imposed by the UN 
Security Council. An innovative mechanism to improve sanctions regimes has been the 
establishment of ad hoc panels of experts, mandated by the Security Council to monitor 
sanctions against the RUF in Sierra Leone, the regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia, the 
Taliban and, later, Al-Qaida, and, most recently, to monitor the arms embargoes in 
Somalia and in eastern DRC. Starting with the groundbreaking Angola Monitoring 
Mechanism in 2000, expert panels and their investigative reports to the Security Council 
have by now become a routine instrument of ‘non-coercive diplomacy’.20  
As to whether sanctions have contributed to conflict resolution, the jury is still out. 
Clearly, weapons and commodity embargoes raise the opportunity costs for those 
targeted; commodity sanctions and the reports by the expert panels have raised 
awareness of the economic dimensions of conflict; expert panel investigations have also 
provided important insights into the range of actors who continue to engage in 
sanctions  busting and into the role of natural resources in fuelling war economies. 
However, there is increasing agreement on the technical and political limits of sanctions 
(even in their targeted form) as a policy instrument (Wallensteen, Staibano and Eriksson 
2003). They are undermined by a demonstrated unwillingness of the Security Council to 
enforce them effectively and to follow up on the findings from the expert panels. For 
instance, secondary sanctions against neighbouring states implicated in sanctions-
busting were imposed only once—in the case of Liberia (Resolution 1343) for its role as 
an export nation for smuggled conflict diamonds from the RUF rebels. Even well-
known sanctions-busters enjoy practically unrestrained impunity, as best personified by 
Victor Bout, the notorious arms-trafficker featured in several expert panel reports. Bout 
has been quoted in a New York Times Magazine interview as saying ‘maybe I should 
start an arms-trafficking university and teach a course on UN sanctions-busting’ 
(Landesman 2003).  
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Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo in that it was not linked to any sanctions 
regime, but was to investigate in more general terms the illicit economic activities of key actors to the 
DRC conflict (see United Nations 2001).  10 
Commercial or geopolitical interests of Security Council members provide additional 
obstacles. In the case of Liberia, France and China, both permanent members of the 
Security Council with important interests in the tropical timber trade, resisted the 
imposition of timber sanctions against Liberia for two years. More recently, 
‘diplomatic’ pressure was exerted by several capitals on the UN Secretariat and 
members of the DRC Expert Panel to clear certain companies of allegations made in the 
panel’s final report, resulting in a much weaker text (RAID 2004). Equally worrying 
were the efforts by the US administration, with UK backing, to resist efforts to include 
Victor Bout, allegedly a supplier for coalition forces in Iraq, on a UN list of individuals 
subject to financial freezes for their association with Charles Taylor’s former regime, 
himself subject to UN targeted sanctions (Turner 2004).  
The certification of rough diamonds implicated in financing armed conflict through the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is promising. Initiated in May 2000 
under the chairmanship of the South African government to deny ‘conflict diamonds’ 
access to international markets, the Kimberley Process was the outcome of commercial, 
reputational, and humanitarian concerns among its government, industry, and civil 
society participants. The KPCS, which came into effect in January 2003, represents the 
first certification system that in a detailed manner deals with the trade in conflict goods 
(Grant and Taylor 2004). Despite its shortcomings with regards to, inter alia, 
independent verification and compliance monitoring, the KPCS may help address the 
much more widespread trade in ‘illegal diamonds’, which has contributed to systemic 
corruption, and, ultimately, violent state collapse in several countries. Usefully, while 
membership in the KPCS is voluntary, the Kimberley regime utilizes a combination of 
legal norms and market forces to encourage countries to join given that they would 
otherwise not be allowed to trade legally in diamonds with KPCS member states. 
(Smillie 2005). Following a peer review mission last year, the membership of the 
Republic of Congo was suspended due to lax regulation of its diamond industry.   
Other regulatory frameworks—including on the suppression of money laundering, 
narcotics trafficking, international organized crime and high-level corruption, as well as 
efforts to control terrorist finance—have evolved rapidly in recent years, though not 
necessarily in response to civil wars. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, these 
issues gained additional policy profile as part of the global fight against terrorism. 
Nevertheless, regulatory approaches to organized crime, especially those against drug 
traffickers, have a history of failure, which cautions against over-reliance on such 
instruments. 
Targeting the finances of combatants may be a cost-effective means of influencing the 
behaviour of combatant elites in civil wars. Relevant technology and expertise are 
already available in relation to drug traffickers and terrorists groups and could be 
applied to belligerents. On money laundering, OECD’s Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF) has become the most effective international instrument. Its 
recently updated 40 Recommendations address issues crucial to the financial dimension 
of conflict and, as Jonathan Winer (2005) argues, they may even allow a direct 
application of the FATF’s mechanisms to conflict commodities. Yet this potential 
remains to be tested.  
Reports that Al-Qaida had laundered money by buying diamonds in West Africa 
establish a link between terrorism, conflict trade, and money-laundering in civil war 
contexts (Global Witness 2003; Farah 2004). The mandate of the UN’s Counter- 
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Terrorism Committee (CTC), tasked with monitoring implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1373 on the suppression of terrorist finance, has two possible 
applications to contemporary war economies. First, the international legal framework 
against terrorists and their financial networks may be applied to trace and curtail 
financial flows to combatant groups. While premature at this point, an expansion of the 
CTC’s mandate to include also commodity trade supporting combatant groups may be 
possible in the long term. More promising at present are the technical assistance 
provisions of the CTC to assist states in developing and strengthening their financial 
intelligence and banking sectors, which also hold potential lessons for improved 
sanctions enforcement (see Eckert 2005).  
The regulation of private sector activities in zones of conflict has emerged as a 
controversial but timely issue in the field of corporate social responsibility, human 
rights, and peace and security, raising the questions of whether, how, and by whom 
companies operating in war zones should be regulated (Lilly and Le Billon 2002; 
Banfield, Haufler and Lilly 2003). The debate on corporate regulation is centred on the 
‘voluntary versus mandatory’ dichotomy, with companies, industry organizations, and 
governments stressing the importance of voluntary self-regulation, and NGOs, activists, 
and legal experts arguing for mandatory regulation. However, there is growing 
recognition that policy development has to take place along a continuum rather than a 
dichotomy, ranging from voluntary codes of conduct to corporate regulation under 
national and international law.21  
Voluntary codes of conduct, such as the UN Global Compact, can be quickly adopted 
by companies, and in the long run may promote changes in the corporate culture and 
internal practices. Yet, company representatives raised several issues of concern which 
need to be addressed. For instance, the proliferation of voluntary codes of conduct at the 
firm, sector and multi-sector level has created confusion and ‘code-fatigue’ among 
companies. In the absence of clear minimal standards, companies are understandably 
reluctant to sign on to new initiatives for fear of moving goal posts (Ballentine 
2004a: 15-6). A significant obstacle to voluntarism acknowledged by both companies 
and NGOs is the ‘collective action problem’ exposing more progressive companies to 
possible loss of competitive advantage. For instance, BP in Angola faced accusations of 
breach of contract and threats from the government in Luanda when the company 
announced that it planned to publicly disclose all payments made to the government. 
Company representatives admit that they would not repeat such a step unless their 
competitors did the same. Similarly, when in 2002—partly, at least, due to public 
pressure and shareholder activism—the Canadian company Talisman Energy and the 
UK company Premier Oil disinvested from Sudan and Burma respectively, their assets 
were bought by their state-owned joint venture partners, India’s Natural Gas Corp. and 
Petronas from Malaysia, who did not face the same domestic pressures. While a success 
for NGO campaigns and shareholder action, the situation on the ground is unaffected.  
This highlights the need, in some circumstances, for mandatory regulation as a 
complementary mechanism to voluntary self-regulation to compel more compliance by 
those business actors less amenable to public pressure (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2004). 
The potential for a legal framework that would regulate corporate activities in conflict 
zones has become the subject of increased interest and formed a part of the EACW 
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programme’s work. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, diverse human rights 
instruments, as well as international human rights and humanitarian law are relevant in 
this connection. Yet, there is currently little normative or conceptual, let alone legal, 
consensus among NGOs, academics, and legal experts as to what business activities 
should be subject to legal regulation. A systematic assessment of the legal liability of 
companies under national and international law was conducted by the EACW 
programme in partnership with the Fafo Institute in Norway.22 While a legal regime 
may appear utopian today, the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 
seemed utopian even ten years ago. The announcement by that Court’s chief prosecutor 
in 2003 to investigate the financial dimension of the crimes committed in the Eastern 
DRC, sent shockwaves through some boardrooms around the world and illustrated how 
far we have moved down the legal track.23  
However, the creation of a robust international regulatory framework will be 
insufficient on its own. Control and interdiction efforts to curtail resource and financial 
flows to combatants face several challenges that need to be overcome. 
Conflict-prone or war-torn countries typically lack the law enforcement, intelligence, 
and border policing capacities that are required for effective enforcement of interdiction 
and control regimes. There is thus an urgent need for more targeted capacity-building, 
possibly also as part of technical development assistance. The CTC, Kimberley Process, 
and the FATF regimes may provide important lessons learned in this field. 
Interdiction and control regimes may have unintended consequences for conflict 
dynamics and key stakeholders. Interdiction tends to raise the prices of the goods it 
seeks to interdict—and thus also potential profit margins for conflict entrepreneurs. An 
obvious example is the half-hearted effort to interdict poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 
a main source of income for local warlords (Burnett 2003; Rubin 2004). In Bosnia, local 
strongmen benefited significantly from smuggling activities in circumvention of 
sanctions, strengthening their influence over the country’s fragile political and 
economic post-war institutions (Andreas 2004; Pugh 2002). In order to minimize the 
harm regulatory approaches may cause to the most vulnerable conflict stakeholders, 
sensitivity to their plight should be the sine qua non conditioning factor for any policy 
action. (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003a: 15-6; Jackson 2005). 
Corporate regulation in conflict zones may face its strongest challenge in the trade-offs 
that home governments face in encouraging international social and environmental 
responsibility by their companies. When allegations arose in 1999 that the Sudanese 
government used revenues derived from Canadian-based Talisman Energy’s oil 
operations in Sudan to fund its military campaign against rebels in the south—a war that 
involved bombing raids against civilian villages and massive forced displacement—
Canadian Foreign Minister Axworty commissioned the ‘Harker Report’ on human 
security in Sudan, which inter alia investigated the role of oil exploitation in the 
conflict. While Axworthy may have hoped the report’s findings would help convince 
his cabinet colleagues that a halt should be put to Talisman’s activities in Sudan, the 
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company was a major employer in Calgary, and the Canadian government seemed more 
sensitive to domestic job creation than to ethical considerations relating to a distant war.  
Even the most robust policies to curtail resource flows to combatants may produce 
diminishing returns as new illicit activities and networks and means to evade detection 
develop. Regulation tends to be responsive rather than preemptive. Ultimately, in the 
absence of efforts to address the causes of conflict, regulatory efforts will primarily 
address the symptoms of conflicts and not their causes.  
4.2  Integrating the economic dimensions of armed conflict into international 
peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding 
Many of the research findings generated in recent years challenge core assumptions of 
policymakers. The notion of a ‘comprehensive political settlement’, used to describe 
many of the peace agreements brokered by the UN during the past decade, suggests that 
the formal end of armed hostilities marks a definite break with past patterns of conflict 
and violence. This has rarely been the case. The formal end of conflict in countries such 
as Sierra Leone, Angola, Afghanistan, the DRC, and Sudan, did not bring an end to the 
predatory economic relationships fostered during wartime. If left unattended, these 
relationships can fatally undermine subsequent efforts at peacebuilding and leave lasting 
developmental distortions.  
Until very recently, the main focus of both conflict analysis and policy action remained 
on the national level. Yet, in most conflict theatres, regional factors are crucial to the 
onset and the character of warfare, and, consequently, for conflict resolution. Cross-
border dynamics (such as invasion, refugee flows, loss of trade for neighbouring states, 
cross-border raids, inflows of small arms) are generally treated as ‘spillover’ 
phenomenon (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998; Brown 1996). Fortunately, cross-
border dimensions of today’s conflicts are newly seen as more systematic than 
previously recognized. The concept of ‘regional conflict formations’, which Barney 
Rubin defines as ‘sets of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages 
with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts’ 
has been extremely helpful in our work (Rubin 2001).24 The EACW work on Sierra 
Leone, Afghanistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed that the war economies 
sustaining these conflicts thrive on deeply embedded political, military, economic, and 
social linkages with neighbouring state elites, informal trading networks, regional 
kinship and ethnic groups, arms traffickers, mercenaries, and commercial entities, each 
of which may have a vested economic interest in the prolongation of conflict and 
instability (Cooper and Pugh 2004; Studdard 2004). 
Those brokering peace agreements and planning peace operations (today mostly focused 
on medium-term peacebuilding rather than merely short-term stabilization) within the 
UN and the world’s capitals have become increasingly interested in the operational 
implications of these dynamics. At a 2003 IPA-sponsored conference on Transforming 
War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, several policy 
mechanisms and strategies were identified for governments, aid agencies, regional 
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organizations, IFIs, and the UN system to increase the odds for successful peacemaking 
and peacekeeping.25  
Assessing the economic endowments and activities of combatants and their sponsors, 
will help third-party mediators to identify possible spoilers. Where politically feasible, 
they should seek to foster provisions for resource-sharing in peace agreements, such as 
in the current peace process in Sudan, which incorporates provisions for the sharing of 
oil revenues alongside power-sharing agreements. Closer consultation and cooperation 
with IFI representatives during the peace process must take place to ensure 
complementarity of UN and IFI strategies, as famously was not the case in El Salvador 
(see de Soto and Castillo 1994). This may well mean challenging some core 
assumptions and approaches of contemporary peacebuilding orthodoxy (Woodward 
2002; Pugh 2002; Paris 2004). 
The process of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former 
combatants has become a standard tool of UN missions and donors in countries 
emerging from armed conflict. A difficult and expensive process in Afghanistan, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia suggests serious challenges. Where fighters have been remunerated 
in the form of natural resource exploitation or civilian predation, their proclivity to 
voluntarily disarm and return to civilian life may depend on their expectations for 
socioeconomic reintegration in the form of access to land, education, or other income 
and employment opportunities (Date-Bah 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). 
Reintegration assistance needs to be introduced early on to undercut the temptations for 
continued participation in the war economy. In Sierra Leone, for instance, many ex-
combatants not reached by the UN’s reintegration programme became a serious security 
threat, mobilizing for protest and moving to the diamond areas where they challenged 
local youth groups or were recruited as mercenaries for the war in Liberia (Durch et al. 
2003: 30). For UN peacekeeping missions, renewed focus on reintegration programmes 
may require more coordination with humanitarian and development actors, and must be 
met with up-front provision of funds for ‘quick impact’ reintegration projects, involving 
job provision.  
Criminal networks relating to the shadow economy are a major challenge in many post-
conflict contexts (Pugh 2002; Williams and Picarelli 2005) A primary task must be 
strengthening law enforcement and the judicial sector as part of security sector reforms. 
Outside cooperation on law enforcement and mutual legal assistance, as well as direct 
policing by UN peace missions, can provide encouragement (TraCCC 2001). But 
increased attention needs to be paid to creating incentives and alternative income-
generating activities for entrepreneurs and others engaged in the shadow economy to 
‘turn legal’. To tackle the regional shadow trade and smuggling in countries with weak 
border policing capacities, structural incentives for licit cross-border trade need to be 
created. Improved cooperation within regional and sub-regional organizations (such as 
ECOWAS or the Mano River Union) or through multilateral agreements are thus, in 
principle, very useful (Cooper and Pugh 2004: 219-38).  
Where the illegal exploitation or corrupt and inequitable management of natural 
resources has been central to conflict dynamics, the early restoration of transparent and 
accountable resource governance in the post-conflict period is crucial. This requires in-
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15 
depth transformation of predatory state institutions that promote kleptocratic rent-
seeking rather than socially beneficial economic activity. Clear donor strategies are 
needed. As experience with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project highlights, increased 
technical assistance for public administration, particularly in the areas of financial 
oversight, budgeting, accounting, and public expenditure reviews, can and should 
become an integral part of donor post-conflict programmes. While the project’s success 
is still uncertain, the issue of resource management deserves further systematic scrutiny 
by development and security practitioners. Experts have suggested, for instance, that a 
multi-stakeholder trust fund for the Ituri region in the DRC should be established to 
collect, monitor and allocate resource revenues as part of peacebuilding efforts in the 
country (Heller, Krasner, and McMillan 2003). 
Loan agreements and technical aid should also feature provisions for effective legal and 
administrative regulation for corporate engagement in natural resource industries. The 
World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), can play 
an important role in designing extractive industry codes and mining policies that help 
minimize the risk of corruption and corporate malfeasance, by, for instance, integrating 
transparency provisions for corporations and host governments. The IFC’s open support 
for the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign as well as the recent announcement of the 
Angolan and Nigerian governments to participate in the UK-sponsored Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) provide important examples of an increased 
sensitivity to the issue of revenue transparency (Global Witness 2004). 
5 The  way  ahead 
Where economic factors are dominant in conflict, greater challenges for conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding will exist. Several issues for further 
research and policy action are offered as concluding thoughts. 
First, research findings on how economic factors impact on the causes, characteristics 
and duration of conflict have been useful. Quantitative studies that test theories by 
academics are important, yet they are likely to have only limited policy impact given 
their often contradictory conclusions. More systematic field-based research is needed on 
the political economy of armed conflict, particularly on those dynamics that suggest 
entry points for more effective policy action. As Ross (2004a) indicates, ‘statistical 
correlations can only take us so far’. Whether addressing the so-called root causes of 
conflict, providing capacity-building for transparent and accountable resource 
management schemes, providing technical assistance for the establishment of a 
transparent financial sector, or providing alternative livelihoods to former combatants, 
the synergy effects between aid and security need to be more systematically analysed 
and reflected in policy development (Collier et al. 2003). Important work is underway 
in various organizations, such as UNU-WIDER and ODI, addressing key issues for 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding and foreign aid (Addison 2003; 
Carbonnier 1998; Le Billon 2000b, and Collinson 2003). An important issue for more 
systematic research is the political economy of security sector reform (Brömmelhörster 
and Paes 2003; Hendrickson and Ball 2002). 
Second, a strong case has now been made for continued support by donors and other 
governments of policy development on the economic dimensions of conflict. The role of 16 
governments is crucial in achieving an effective, fair, and workable framework of global 
governance that stands a chance to effectively address the linkages between local war 
economies and the global consumer markets for conflict goods, be they diamonds, 
timber, or drugs. Governments and multilateral agencies need to improve cooperation to 
strengthen the conventions against transnational organized crime, terrorist funding, and 
the mechanisms against money laundering and corruption. In addition to corporate self-
regulation, mandatory and even legal frameworks are required to effectively address 
corporate engagement in conflict zones.  
Yet, in terms of driving the agenda forward, some degree of realism is needed. As we 
have seen with respect to Canada and Talisman, even the best-intentioned ideas can fall 
victim to the types of trade-offs that policymakers must make to accommodate diverse 
constituencies. Similarly, when several members of the UK Cabinet wanted to tackle the 
role of the UK finance sector in attracting ill-gotten gains of repressive officials from 
conflict areas, others countered that this should not be achieved at the risk of loosing out 
to financial sector rivals such as Switzerland. Real interests—and big money—are often 
at stake. NGO, academic and media advocates need to be aware of these factors and 
design strategies to overcome them that acknowledge the costs as well as the benefits of 
action. Here, the role of the private financial markets as a lever for change in business 
practice deserves further scrutiny (Mansley 2005).  
Lastly, one cannot overemphasize the role of the UN system in driving the policy 
agenda forward. The UN Secretariat and the Security Council became engaged in issues 
of illicit economic behaviour during armed conflict in part serendipitously, largely 
through the Council’s imposition of targeted commodity and financial sanctions in the 
1990s. The attention that the Security Council now pays to sanctions-busting, natural 
resource exploitation, the Kimberley Process, and increasingly, the role of private sector 
activity in conflict zones, marks a recognition of the relevance of these issues to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Some of this action was sparked by 
research and advocacy organizations, which have recently enjoyed increasing access to 
the Council (Paul 2004). EACW staff organized and participated in briefings for 
Security Council members and the Secretariat’s most senior officials on conflict issues. 
Many delegates attended expert meetings where findings from our research were 
presented. The Canadian and Norwegian governments championed the issue within the 
UN, making use of their tenure as elected members of the Security Council in 1989-90 
and 1991-92, respectively (see Guaqueta 2002). The German government, a strong 
supporter of the Global Compact, called a meeting during its April 2004 Council 
presidency on ‘The Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and Post-
conflict Peacebuilding’ (United Nations 2004b). However, among the permanent 
Council members, reactions have ranged from the supportive (principally the UK) to the 
sceptical (for example, Russia). 
The Security Council has a crucial role to play in future policy development, not only 
by crafting strategies to control illicit economic behaviour in civil wars, but—not least 
due to its ‘Chapter VII power’—by establishing through its case-by-case decisions new 
global norms concerning such behaviour. Recognizing the detrimental role of conflict 
trade for collective security and conflict prevention, the recently-published report of the 
UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recommends that ‘the United 
Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil 
society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the 
management if natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict’  
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(United Nations 2004a: 35). The UN Secretariat also has a strong interest in these 
issues, given its responsibility for designing and implementing post-conflict strategies 
on the ground that needs to take economic factor into greater consideration, not least in 
existing and upcoming peace operations in Liberia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, and the 
Balkans. Recently, the Secretariat has been strikingly open to academic and policy-
oriented research relevant to its post-conflict work, a tribute to strong current leadership 
of its Political Affairs, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Departments as well as an 
interest in these issues within the office of the Secretary-General (Nitzschke and Malone 
2004). As the Secretary-General recently stated ‘the time has come to translate ad hoc 
efforts into a more systematic approach’ (United Nations 2004b: 4). The establishment 
by Kofi Annan in 2003 of the Interagency Group on the Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict is an important first step. 
Stay tuned! This exciting field of research and policy development has been fast-
moving in recent years and is likely to remain so.  
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